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AS GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE DECREASES,
HOMELESSNESS INCREASES: A CLOSER LOOK AT
WELFARE, HOUSING AND HOMELESSNESS
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INTRODUCTION
Homelessness is the result of a combination of factors. Cuts in
welfare programs and a lack of affordable housing figure prominently
among the factors which displace people from their homes. Cuts in
public assistance mean less money to pay rent. A lack of affordable
housing causes greater competition for housing among the poor.
These two problems prompt a continued growth in homelessness.
Both problems are the direct result of conscious government
policy portrayed as cost saving. However, the money saved by the
federal government often results in higher costs elsewhere. Federal
savings translate into increased costs for state and city governments,
and increased costs for the people who lose their welfare and housing
and end up on the streets. The cuts are not sensible public policy in
light of these hidden costs.
This article examines the way cuts in public assistance along with
a decrease in affordable housing has resulted in an increase in
competition for fewer homes. A direct result of the intersection of
cuts in welfare benefits and in affordable housing programs is the
growth in homelessness we have seen over the past one-and-a-half
decades. Part I of this article discusses the effects of welfare cuts on
the poor. In part II, the decline in affordable housing over the past
fifteen years is examined. The hidden costs associated with
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homelessness are discussed in part Ill. Finally, the conclusion
suggests that an increase in affordable housing along with an increase
in welfare would eliminate much homelessness.
I. INSUFFICIENT AND DIMINISHING WELFARE BENEFITS
A. Introduction to Welfare
Welfare is defined as "the state or condition of doing well or
being well; good fortune, happiness, or well-being...; prosperity. I
"Safety net" programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC),2 Supplemental Security Income (SSI),' the Food
Stamp Program,4 and Housing Assistance programs were originally
established to keep the poor from going hungry or becoming
homeless,' and to enable children to maintain a normal family life.6
Access to the programs is limited to those who satisfy eligibility
requirements and different programs provide different benefit levels.7
Qualifications for the various programs involve many factors in
addition to income. As a result, several families with the same
income may receive significantly different benefits. One family may
receive a combination of food stamps, medical benefits, housing
subsidies and a cash grant while another may obtain only food stamps,
more limited medical benefits, and a limited cash grant for two months
1. RUTH SIDEL, WOMEN & CHILDREN LAST 77 (Penguin Books, 1987) quoting The
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.
2. Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-17 (1988).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (1993).
4. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.1 (1995).
5. See generally FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWERD. REGULATING THE
POOR, THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1993).
6. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-615 (1988).
7. For example, there is one program exclusively for the elderly and disabled (SSI),
and another largely for single parents (AFDC). Elderly and disabled individuals are entitled
to higher grants under SSI than single parents receive under AFDC. See SIDEL, supra note
1, at 85.
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every two years.8 A third family may receive no benefits at all, and
a fourth, comprised of elderly or disabled members9, may receive
much greater assistance than the other three.'" Individuals who do
not fit into one of the categories of eligible recipients are not entitled
to assistance." For example, poor, childless, able-bodied persons
are not eligible for any federal cash assistance, although they may be
eligible for food stamps. Food stamp eligibility is much broader than
eligibility for AFDC. 2
B. Shrinking Benefits and Enhanced Housing Costs
Changes in governmental sources of income support in the 1970's
and 1980's have decreased the amount of resources available to the
poor. 3  Housing costs rose as public assistance was cut, and as a
result, poor households had more difficulty finding affordable
8. In Pennsylvania, for example, a single adult aged 18 or older who is deemed to
be able-bodied is presently entitled to cash benefits for two months every two years and to
food stamps. Act 49 of 1994, 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201 (1994).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (1993).
10. The federal program for the disabled provides a much larger cash grant than the
combined federal and state program for single parent families, which in turn is larger than the
state program for single able-bodied adults. For example, in Pennsylvania, a single adult
receives $205 per month for two months every two years from the General Assistance (GA)
program administered by the state. This contrasts sharply with the disabled individual
receiving SSI from the federal government, who may live next door to the GA recipient, and
have many of the same costs, but will receive $478.40 per month every month of the year.
The grant amounts for the single parent family and the single able-bodied adult are the same,
but the single parent family receives grants year-round, while the single able-bodied adult does
not.
11. Food stamps are available to everyone below a certain income. See 7 C.F.R.
§ 273.1 (1995).
12. Recourse for single able-bodied adults is sometimes available on the local level
(sometimes referred to as general assistance, home relief, public assistance, or general relief).
However. many communities have no general assistance programs, and those that do have
such programs provide relatively low monthly payments, often restrict access in various ways,
and require recipients to work or look for work in order to qualify to receive benefits. See
Martha R. Burt, The Income Side of Housing Affordability: Shifts in Household Income and
Income Support Programs during the 1970s and 1980s, in HOMELESSNESS - A PREVENTION-
ORIENTED APPROACH 247 (Rene I. Jahiel ed., 1992).
13. See id. at 239; see discussion infra part I.B.2.
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housing. 4 When public assistance decreased, affordable housing
became increasingly scarce for the extremely poor. 15
1. Inadequate Benefits to Cover Housing Costs
AFDC grants, which were never intended to provide a family with
more than a bare-bones existence, have been cut repeatedly since the
program's inception. Present grant levels are too low to cover market
rate housing, and therefore, AFDC recipients require housing
assistance. Yet less than 25% of AFDC recipients receive housing
subsidies from the government. 6 As a result, families are forced to
reside in substandard housing, to scrimp on essentials such as food and
clothing, to pay part of the rent and owe the remainder, to share
apartments with other families ("double-up"), or to work illegally ("off
the books") in order to avoid becoming homeless.
AFDC is designed to cover basic food, clothing and shelter needs.
However, the average monthly cost of a rental unit in this country is
over $300, while the median AFDC grant for a family of three is
$354.17 After paying the rent each month, the average family on
AFDC is left with $54 to cover food, clothing, and other needs.
Decreases in AFDC are due to a failure to keep pace with inflation,18
14. See id.
15. Income plays a central role in obtaining housing regardless of whether housing
costs rise or fall. If income falls more rapidly than housing costs, even if rents are dropping,
some people will not be able to afford housing and thus, become homeless. Likewise, if
income is rising, but housing costs are rising more quickly, people will be closed out of the
housing market notwithstanding the fact that their income is rising. See id. at 238.
16. See Barbara Sard and Mary Ellen Hombs, Legal Services Homeless Task Force
Memorandum to the Working Group on Housing Issues in Welfare Reform Regarding
Homelessness and Housing-Related Proposals (Oct. 20, 1993) (on file with author).
17. See Linda A. Wolf, The Welfare System's Response to Homelessness, in
HOMELESS CHII.;DREN AND YOUTH: A NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA 271,272 (Julec H. Kryder-
Coe et al. eds., 1991).
18. See Sylvia Law, Symposium on Poverty and the Law, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 75, 78 (1987); Sylvia Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and Preservation of Patriarchy,
131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249, 1322-28 (1983): Barbara Sard, Florence Roisman and Chester
Hartman, A Dialogue on Welfare and Housing Strategies, in 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 105,
106 (Rhoda Schulzinger ed., 1989).
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cuts in benefit levels, 9 and administrative and other cut-offs of
families substantively eligible. The median AFDC grant level
decreased 36% in value between 1970 and 1988.20
2. Government Cuts to AFDC
Under the Reagan administration, AFDC was subjected to severe
cuts. The first cuts came soon after Reagan took office when $1
billion t was slashed from the $7 billion federal AFDC budget.
Another $1 billion was lost in state matching funds. Furthermore, the
newly enacted legislation disqualified large numbers of recipients who
formerly qualified for assistance.?3 As a result, almost 500,000
families became ineligible for AFDC and an additional 300,000 had
their benefits cut due to a change in treatment of earned income under
the new legislation. Together these families represented 21% of
AFDC families. Families with a working parent were the most
severely affected.2'
A second devastating cut was instituted the following year. This
time an additional $85 million was diverted from the AFDC budget?
Combined with the loss of state matching funds, $170 million was lost
in total. Furthermore, the federal government enacted new provisions
requiring state compliance in order to receive federal monies.26 In
addition to the mandatory provisions, this legislation also contained
19. See discussion infra part I.B.2.; see Sidel, supra note 1. at 86.
20. See Burt, supra note 12, at 248.
21. This cut was contained within the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981
(OBRA), Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981).
22. See Sidel, supra note 1, at 86.
23. The federal government enacted new provisions, some optional and some
mandatory, which disqualified large numbers of recipients who previously qualified for
AFDC. Mandatory provisions included lowering the income level for eligibility, changing
the calculations applied to working parents, step-parent deeming, eliminating benefits to
pregnant women prior to the sixth month of pregnancy, and requiring monthly reporting by
recipients. See id.
24. See Burt. supra note 12, at 248.
25. See The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248.
96 Stat. 324 (1982).
26. See supra note 23.
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some provisions relating to the determination of eligibility and benefits
levels which states had the option of adopting at their discretion.27
3. Effects of the Cuts to AFDC
One out of four poor children previously covered by AFDC lost
his benefits during the Reagan years.2" In 1979, 88% of all poor
families were receiving AFDC; by 1983 only 63% were receiving
AFDC.2 9 Today the figure is even lower. Homelessness has become
more prevalent as benefit levels under AFDC have dropped.3 Some
scholars have suggested that the loss of AFDC has also resulted in a
loss in medicaid (in 20 states), and that many families have also
experienced a lost in food stamps and housing assistance due to these
cuts.
3 1
C. No Welfare for the Homeless
Many homeless people do not take advantage of welfare
programs for which they could qualify.32 Current estimates indicate
that no more than one-half of the homeless receive any form of
27. Optional provisions included permitting the counting of housing subsidies and
food stamps when determining eligibility and benefit levels and requiring recipients to work
off their AFDC grant ("workfare"). See Sidel, supra note 1, at 87.
28. See Burt, supra note 12, at 249.
29. See Sidel, supra note 1, at 87; CHILDREN IN POVERTY REPORT FOR THE
COMMITTEE ON' WAYS AND MEANS BY THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE AND THE
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE at 192 (1985).
30. See THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON
HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA'S CITIES: 1992, 71 (1992).
31. See Sidel, supra note 1, at 87. However, other scholars argue there is no direct
link between the loss of the AFDC and the loss of medicaid, food stamps, and housing
assistance. Interview with Amy Hirsch, Staff Attorney at Community Legal Services. in
Philadelphia, PA.(Apr. 12, 1995).
32. See F. STEVENS REDBURN & TERRY F. Buss, RESPONDING TO AMERICA'S
HOMELESS, 47 (Praeger, 1986); ROSSI, FISHER & WILLIS, THE CONDITION OF THE HOMELESS
IN CHICAGO, 47 (Social and Demographic Research Institute, 1986); JAMES WRIGHT &
ELEANOR WEBER, HOMELESSNESS AND HEALTH, (McGraw-Hill, 1987). Redburn's
conclusions are limited to single white males in Ohio where he conducted his research.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol3/iss1/7
1996] WELFARE, HOUSING AND HOMELESSNESS 117
entitlement. 3
There are a number of explanations for why homeless people do
not receive the public assistance to which they are entitled. Some
people are unable to wait on line for long periods of time, or to
complete the lengthy paperwork required to obtain public
assistance.' Others may not be aware that they are eligible for
benefits. People may not know where to apply for public
assistance, or may be given improper application instructions, or may
"not be persistent enough to extract from the system that to which they
are entitled." 36 Others may lose benefits because of intermittent paid
labor or frequent moves.37  Bureaucratic errors also cause many
people, including the homeless, not to receive public assistance
benefits .3  Those who are not homeless but have had their benefits
cut due to bureaucratic error often become homeless. 3
9
Once one becomes homeless, obtaining public assistance is even
33. See PETER Rossi, WITHOUT SHELTER - HOMELESSNESS IN THE 1980's, 75 n.2
(Priority Press, 1989). Some explain the low level of participation in public assistance by
stating that those who do participate are less likely to become homeless because they will be
able to afford some type of shelter. See id. at 47. However, it is unlikely that people
receiving General Assistance (GA) payments for two months every two years, e.g.,
Pennsylvania residents, will be able to afford lodging in a Single Room Occupancy (SRO)
hotel or a cheap apartment on an annual basis. While recipients may be able to afford
accommodations for a brief period after obtaining their benefits check, when the money is
gone they will again be without housing. In an interview with Roberto in a Philadelphia
shelter in the spring of 1994. he described this scenario to me. He received SSDI, and would
stay in a cheap hotel after receiving his check each month until the money ran out. Once the
money was gone, he would go to a shelter or sleep in the streets for the rest of the month
until he received his next check.
34. Redburn, supra note 32, at 47. The mentally ill are particularly susceptible to
these types of problems. See JUDGE ROBERT C. COATES, A STREET IS NOT A HOME -
SOLVING AMERICA'S HOMELESS DILEMMA, 290 (1990).
35. See Redburn, supra note 32, at 47.
36. See id. at 48 (noting that the process which precedes receipt of public assistance
is lengthy and complicated).
37. See id.
38. See id. at 47.
39. See Anna L. Dehavenon, Charles Dickens Meets Franz Kafka: The
Maladministration of New York City's Public Assistance Programs. 17 N.Y.U. REV. OF L.
& Soc. CHANGE 231. 234 (1989-90).
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more difficult.4" Homeless individuals and families are often denied
public assistance despite their eligibility to receive benefit; under the
regulations." Such a result is entirely inconsistent with the
underlying goal of welfare. Welfare is supposed to protect people
from economic destitution. When homeless people are denied welfare,
the system has failed twice: initially, by allowing a person to become
destitute enough to lose her home, and again by denying her assistance
when she applies while homeless.
1. No Address, No Welfare
Problems obtaining benefits arise because homeless people
generally don't have addresses.42 Almost all welfare programs
require that recipients have an address. Benefits may be indefinitely
denied solely on the basis of a lack of an address. Ironically, as long
as benefits are denied, a homeless person's potential to obtain an
address decreases because she will not have money for essentials,
including rent.43 Recent litigation has been successful in eradicating
the address requirement in many jurisdictions," and recent legislation
has eliminated this requirement for recipients of food stamps and
Medicaid everywhere; however, the requirement remains for many
40. In a Chicago study conducted among the homeless, more than 70% of those
eligible for General Assistance (GA) reported applying, but most had been turned down or
were accepted and later terminated. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 48. Ninety-six percent of
those eligible for AFDC reported applying, yet only 7% were currently receiving benefits.
The other applicants had either been turned down, or accepted and later terminated. See id.
The reasons for termination listed in the welfare departments records were primarily technical
violations such as failing to register at employment agencies or failing to keep appointments
with caseworkers. See id.
41. See Gary L. Blasi, The Role of Legal Aid Organizations in Helping Homeless
People, in HOMELESSNESS: A PREVENTION-ORIENTED APPROACH, 300 (Relic Jahiel ed.,
1992).
42. See Redburn, supra note 32, at 47. The bar to obtaining public assistance if one
does not have an address was lifted in 1987, but recipients still report that they are denied
benefits for not having an address. See id. While conducting a client interview at the Public
Housing Unit of Community Legal Services on January 24, 1995, a client reported to me that
she had been denied AFDC because she was homeless and did not have an address.
43. See Blasi, supra note 41, at 301.
44. See Coates, supra note 34, at 290.
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other programs.45
2. No Identification, No Welfare Benefits
Another barrier to obtaining public assistance faced by the
homeless is the requirement that recipients provide identification to the
welfare department in order to receive assistance. Without
documentary identification emergency assistance is often denied.'
For homeless people, this barrier can block access to assistance for a
considerable length of time. It is difficult to maintain one's
possessions on the streets, where muggings and robberies are
commonplace. Furthermore, identification replacement costs money,
takes weeks or months, and requires extensive documentation.47 This
practice of requiring identification was successfully challenged in Los
Angeles, where welfare applicants had to produce certified copies of
their birth certificates to apply for the county's General Relief
Program. Homeless people in Los Angeles sued the county welfare
department to obtain relief from this requirement. The department had
instituted this requirement to control intake for the General Relief
Program. When too many people applied, the department would
require certified birth certificates as a mechanism to decrease the case
load. The court intervened and instructed the welfare department to
end the practice.48
For homeless mentally ill individuals, denial of assistance is
commonplace due to an inability to complete the application and
recertification processes.49 The complex form, long wait, and other
tasks associated with obtaining benefits are often overwhelming for
those who suffer from mental or developmental disabilities.
D. Welfare Reform is Not Really Reform
Welfare reform is sweeping the nation. Reform is being initiated
45. See Blasi, supra note 41. at 301.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See Coates, supra note 34, at 290.
49. See Blasi, supra note 41, at 301.
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at the local, state and national levels. On the whole, however,
government proposals for "welfare reform" are not true proposals that
reform the system; they are proposals to cut government spending to
help the poor.5 0 Welfare reform has become synonymous with cuts
in government funding of public assistance programs. These proposals
for reform ignore the needs of recipients. Recipients and their
advocates are not consulted by "reformers. "I' Ultimately, this type
of reform will cost taxpayers more than the present system. The
government may save money in the short run by trimming welfare
budgets, but in the long run, more money will be spent on the side
effects of these costs. 2 There will also be tremendous effects on the
lives of welfare recipients who find their already strained budgets
further depleted.
Contrary to popular sentiment, cutting welfare will not necessarily
save money. While cuts in public assistance grants may allow the
government to decrease public assistance budgets, other programs will
have to be expanded in order to rectify the damage done. For
example, as welfare benefits diminish, homelessness grows.53 As the
number of people who are homeless grows, the government has to
spend more money on programs to assist the homeless.54 Re-housing
the homeless and providing temporary shelter for families on the
streets are extremely expensive endeavors. In addition to these
50. Webster's Dictionary defines reform as "to make better by removing faults and
defects; correct. . . to make better by putting a stop to abuses or malpractices or by
introducing better procedures. . . ." See WEBSTER'S NEw WORLD DICTIONARY OF TIE
AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1194 (2d ed. 1982). When politicians speak of "ending welfare as we
know it" and overhauling the welfare system, the image connoted is different than that
conjured by the rhetoric of alleviating welfare programs, deleting budgets, and redlining
programs which keep the poor from starving and freezing. Some of the proposals currently
being debated do include elements of "true" reform, e.g., workfare and job training, but the
goal is to remove people from the "welfare rolls," not to create a more rational, cost efficient,
user-friendly system.
51. See BETTY G. RUSSELL, SILENT SISTERS: A STUDY OF HOMELESS WOMEN 81
(1991).
52. Factors which will increase government costs include increased homelessness,
a rise in crime, and additional health care costs.
53. See generally Sidel, supra note 1; Sard and Holmes, supra note 16. Wolf, supra
note 17; Sard et al., supra note 18.
54. See Coates, supra note 34, at 245-65.
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expenses, the government incurs costs for providing emergency food
programs and transporting homeless children to school. If the
government's goal is to save money, cuts in public assistance will not
achieve this goal, unless the cuts are not accompanied by the funding
of programs to help the people displaced by the cuts."5
I. HOUSING: A LACK OF AFFORDABLE HOusING
In 1949 the federal government pledged "a decent
home and a suitable living environment for every
American family" in the Federal Housing Act.'
If something does not change soon, we will see
unimaginable numbers of homeless women and
children on the streets as our society shakes itself
free of any pretense of caring about its poor
huddled masses.'
Most poor households in the U.S. pay extremely
large portions of their limited incomes for
housing costs.
58
Poor families are much less likely to receive housing assistance
than to receive some other "safety net" non-cash assistance.59 The
reason poor families do not receive housing assistance is not due to a
failure to qualify under program guidelines, but rather, it is because
55. Some of those committed to alleviating welfare have goals other than saving
money. They advocate reducing illegitimacy and restoring "family values.' See generally
CHARLES A. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND - AMERICAN SOCIAL PoLIcy, 1950-1980 (1984).
This article does not attempt to respond to these arguments.
56. See PAUL LEONARD. CUSHING DOLDEARE & ED LAZERE. A PLACE TO CALL
HOME - THE CRISIS IN HOUSING FOR THE POOR, 28 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
1989) quoting The Federal Housing Act of 1949. 3 U.S.C. § 304 (1949).
57. See Mariana Moore. Commentary, Proposition 165. We Won The Battle, But
Are We Losing the War?. 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 6 (1993).
58. See Leonard et al., supra note 56. at xi.
59. See id. at 27.
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the resources allocated by Congress do not extend far enough to cover
all those in need. While AFDC and food stamps are entitlement
programs,' providing benefits to every eligible family automatically,
housing assistance programs are funded differently. The federal
government allocates a limited amount of money for housing
programs, and the amount does not correlate to the number of families
that need assistance. Once the resources are spent, no further housing
benefits are provided and even applicants who meet the eligibility
requirements do not receive assistance.6' Instead, their names are
placed on a waiting list, assuming the local housing authority is still
accepting applications and adding names to these lists. Some face
waits of 20 years to receive housing assistance.
During the 1980's, there was a tremendous decrease in affordable
housing.62 According to the Department of Housing atnd Urban
Development (HUD), housing is affordable for a low income
60. This may not be the case much longer; the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. Newt Gingrich, and several Republican legislators have proposed legislation
which alleviates the entitlement aspect of these programs.
61. The practical effect is that two families who are equally qualified for housing
assistance (e.g., same income, same number of persons, etc.) may end up with disharmonious
results. One family may receive a subsidized housing unit and the other may receive nothing.
62. See JOHN R. BELCHER & FREDERIcK A. DIBLAsIo, HELPING THIE HOMELESS:
WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? 6 (1990); Leonard et al., supra note 56, at 15: Marta
Elliott & Lauren J. Krivo, Structural Determinants of Homelessness in the United States, 38
Soc. PROBS. 113 (1991); Belcher at 16; Leonard at 15; But see Redburn, supra note 32, at
69 (high vacancy rate and low rents prevalent in Ohio); CHRISTOPHER JENCKS. THE
HOMELESS 84 (1994). Redburn argues that homelessness is due to a lack of income, not an
inadequate supply of low-cost housing. See Redburn at 69. Likewise, Jencks argues that "die
alleged shortage of low-rent housing is a myth." See Jencks at 84 (basing this conclusion
upon "persistently high vacancy rates in cheap housing . . . "). Id.
Some who agree that cheap housing has disappeared argue that it disappeared
because no one wanted to live in it (i.e., because of its undesirability). See id. at 89.
Members of this school of thought point to Census Bureau data reported by landlords which
indicate that they had cheap units without tenants. See id. Opponents of this view argue that
the units portrayed in the census data were not really available to tenants who wanted to rent
them. See id.
Neither side of this debate addresses die issue of whether uninhabitable, vacant
units should count when tallying affordable housing. If a unit has rats, faulty electricity,
inadequate heat, or lead-based paint, and a landlord lists it as a vacant, low-cost unit, should
it count as such? I would argue that it does not count as affordable housing. What about
housing adjacent to crackhouses, or in extremely unsafe neighborhoods? Although units may
be officially available for poor tenants, they are not necessarily habitable.
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household when it costs 30% or less of a household's income.'
Presently, "[a]vailable and affordable low income housing is virtually
non-existent .. ."I Data released in 1989 by the U.S. Bureau of
the Census and by HUD revealed that five out of every six poor renter
households paid more than 30% of their income for housing in
1985. 65 Therefore, most poor people spend more than they can
afford on housing while other necessities are pushed out of reach.
Given this precarious situation, any unexpected rise in expenses can
lead to disastrous results, including homelessness. The government's
primary response to the lack of affordable housing has been to provide
short-term assistance to the homeless rather than to create housing
programs to resolve homelessness. 6
Low income families have been forced to spend more of their
income on housing because the federal government has decreased its
funding for housing assistance over the past ten years.67 Assistance
has been decreased by providing fewer subsidies to people residing in
market rate housing and by providing fewer federal units.' Rental
subsidies have declined tremendously. The housing budget changed
drastically when the Carter administration was replaced by the Reagan
administration. The budget for subsidized housing assistance was cut
by $11.7 billion from Carter's last year to Reagan's first year, from
$24.9 billion to $13.2 billion, and the number of assisted households
dropped by 70%.69
The dramatic decrease in funding in the initial Reagan
administration budget was only a foreshadowing of larger cuts to
follow. In 1983, and again in 1984, President Reagan sought to
63. See Leonard et al., supra note 56, at xi; see Kay Young McChesney, The
Growth of Homelessness: An Aggregate Rather Than an Individual Problem, in
HOMELESSNESS - A PREVENTION ORIENTED APPROACH, 309 (Rene Jahiel ed., 1992).
64. Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights for Battered Women: Axiomatic & Ignored. 11
LAW & INEQ. J. 1 (1992).
65. See Leonard et al., supra note 56, at xi.
66. Susan Bennett. Heartbreak Hotel: The Disharmonious Convergence of Welfare,
Housing and Homelessness, I MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSt 27, 30 (1990).
67. See id. at 34.
68. See id.
69. See id.
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rescind congressionally approved housing appropriations ,70 Cuts
initiated by Reagan continued under President Bush. In 1990, the $7.5
billion budget request for housing subsidies advanced by the Bush
administration "eliminated all funding for construction of public
housing, removed funding from the Section 8 existing housing
subsidy, 71  and doubled the funding allocated for housing
vouchers."72  The request also significantly cut rural housing
assistance, 71 and eliminated most of the programs under the
McKinney Homeless Assistance Act.74
As the number of new households receiving housing assistance
declined, the number of eligible households to be denied assistance
increased.7' In 1979, four million households eligible for housing
assistance received none. By 1987, the number had grown to 5.4
million.76
While the federal government was cutting housing assistance to
the poor, middle- and upper-income families were receiving increasing
levels of assistance from the government.77 The federal government
provides billions to homeowners primarily in the form of tax
deductions for mortgage interest payments and property taxes.78
Federal subsidies to those with incomes above $50,000 are more than
three times the amount provided to those with incomes below
$10,000. 79
70. See Homeless in America: The Need for Permanent Housing, Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development of the House Committee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 485 (1989).
71. Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937, as amended by the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1987), 24 C.F.R. § 882 (1988).
72. Bennett, supra note 66, at 44-5. The government withdrew money from new
housing, and instead put more money into rental subsidies. Vouchers are %ubsidies which
cover a portion of rent.
73. Rural housing assistance was reduced by 77.5%. See id.
74. Those not eliminated were reduced. See Homeless in America, supra note 70,
at 490-491.
75. See Bennett, supra note 66, at 44.
76. See Leonard et al., supra note 56. at xvii.
77. See ARLENE ZAREMBKA, THE URBAN HOUSING CRISIS - SOCIAL, ECONOMIC,
AND LEGAL ISSUES AND PROPOSALS 18 (1990); Leonard et al., supra note 56, at xvii.
78. See Leonard et al., supra note 56, at xvii.
79. See id.
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In addition to these cuts in government spending, a large number
of affordable rental units disappeared from the rental market. Between
1973 and 1983, 4.5 million units, one-half of which were rented to
low income tenants, disappeared from the rental housing market.'
Some of these units were destroyed while others were converted to co-
ops and condominiums. Another factor which further exacerbated the
problem was the federal government's switch in emphasis from new
construction to subsidizing rents on units already in existence)" As
existing housing disappeared, the government did not fund the building
of new affordable housing. Another cause of the disappearance of
low-income housing units was the expiration of twenty-year
restrictions placed on low income housing constructed under §
221(d)(3) of the Housing Act of 19611, and § 236 of the Fair
Housing Act of 1968.8 Once the restrictions expired, the buildings
could satisfy their obligations to the government and begin charging
market-rate rents. 84
80. See National Housing Task Force, A Decent Place to Live, at 6, reprinted in
Hearings before the Subconzn. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 134. 142 (1988).
81. See J.P. Mitchell. Historical Overview of Direct Federal Housing Assistance,
in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS, PAST AND PRESENT 201.203 (J.P. Mitchell
ed. 1985) cited in Bennett, supra note 66. at 45.
82. Pub. L. No. 87-70, 75 Stat. 149 (1961) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C §
1715 (1988)).
83. Pub. L. No. 90-284. 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
3601-31 (1988)); see Bennett. supra note 66. at 45.
84. The growth in the number of poor families between 1978 and 1985 was one
reason for the increase in competition for low cost housing. See Leonard Ct al.. supra note
56, at xiv. 15 (between 1978 and 1985, the number of poor households rose 25%, from 10.5
million to 13.3 million). Another factor which contributed to more intense competition for
affordable housing was a decline in the median income among poor families. In 1978. the
typical poor family had an income which was $3,362 below the poverty line. By 1985, the
figure was $3.999 (these figures have been adjusted for inflation). See id. at 16.
There was also a reduction in the number of affordable housing units. In 1970.
there were 9.7 million affordable housing units, compared to 7.9 million in 1985. This 1.8
million loss represents a 19% decline in affordable housing units. See id. at xiv. 16. But see
Jencks. supra note 62. who argues that the Single Room Occupancies (SROs) were torn down
in the 1960's and early 1970's. This reduction in the number of affordable housing units was
attributable to the expiration of federal restrictions, low cost housing units left vacant, and
structural deficiencies which rendered some units inhabitable. See Leonard et al., supra note
56. at 16. Finally, an increase in rental prices played a role in the growth of the affordable
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Another factor resulting in a loss of housing for those with low
incomes was a shift in the economy. Beginning in the mid-1970's,
manufacturing jobs began to disappear and were replaced by service-
oriented jobs. 5 Many of the manufacturing jobs which employed
unskilled individuals with little education at decent wages were
eliminated. 6  Those who lost jobs during this period had limited
success in regaining employment, while individuals who did find work
had to take significant pay cuts in the service industry. As a result of
this shift in the economy, wages and salaries for these workers were
at approximately the same level in constant dollars in 1990 as they
were in 1960 while prices had more than tripled.'
These changes in the economy contributed to the increased
demand for low cost housing,8 8 which led to higher rents for even the
least expensive housing. Owners could charge more because there
was increased competition for low-income housing continued to soar
while the number of units decreased. Families on fixed incomes, such
as AFDC recipients, lost in the competition with marginally employed
workers who could afford to pay higher rents. "The increasing
number of AFDC families among the homeless is directly related to
the decline in manufacturing jobs, the increase in low-wage service
sector jobs, and an overall increase in the number of families who can
only afford to live in low-income and substandard housing."
89
The federal government's self-removal from the business of
constructing low cost housing has contributed to the dire situation
where few indigent families (or individuals) are able to reside in
housing crunch. See id. at xiv; Jencks, supra note 62, at 67.
85. See Belcher, supra note 62, at 13; Redburn, supra note 32. at 6 (attributing the
loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States to management's desire to reduce workers'
wages).
86. Between 1981 and 1986, 10.8 million workers lost their jobs due to cutbacks and
plant closings. By 1986, only 67% of them had found jobs, and many of those individuals
were managerial and professional workers (75% more likely to find new jobs). Blue collar
workers (operators, fabricators and laborers) were only reemployed in 66% of the cases, and
those who found positions in the service industry earned up to 40% less than they did in
manufacturing. See Belcher, supra note 62, at 13.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 16.
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affordable housing. Fewer than one in three poor households that
rented housing received any governmental housing subsidy in 1987.9
In 1990, for example, only 20% of the poor received any type of
federal housing subsidy. 9 Families headed by young single parents
are most vulnerable to high rent burdens' and face the most serious
housing problems.9 The typical young single parent, in 1987, spent
81% of her income on housing.'
For many poor households, governmental assistance in the form
of subsidized housing programs is not available.9' In 1990, less than
20% of the 3.7 million families on AFDC received housing subsidies.
Sixty-three percent of AFDC families lived in private sector housing,
9.9% in public housing, and 9.8% in federally subsidized rental
units.' Between 1974 and 1987, the number of families with an
income below $5,000 that rented housing and received no housing
assistance increased by one million.'
The ramifications of these data are quite significant. Only 20%
of families who receive AFDC (and are thus poor by definition) will
spend 30% of their income on housing. The remaining families must
pay what the market dictates. The average rent burden in 1987 was
58.4% for single parent families, up from 34.9% in 1974." When
poor families spend a substantial amount of their money on housing,
90. See Leonard et al., supra note 56, at xvi.
91. See Bennett, supra note 66, at 46.
92. According to a Harvard study, rent burdens borne by single parent families,
where the parent is under 25, are the most tendentious. These families have increasingly
faced larger rent increases than have any other group. See William C. Apgar, Jr. and H.
James Brown, The State of the Nation's Housing, 23-28 (The Joint Center for Housing $tudies
of Harvard University, 1988), cited in Leonard et al., supra note 56. at 63.
93. See Leonard et al.. supra note 56. at 63.
94. See id.
95. See id. at xvi.
96. See FAMILY SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE:
CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF AFDC RECIPIENTS. FY 1987. 35
(1987) cited in Bennett, supra note 66, at 46.
97. See JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE
STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING, 1988. at 18 (1988), cited in Bennett, supra note 66, at
46.
98.
97 at 14.
See JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES AT HARVARD UNIVERSrrY.supra note
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they have very little left to cover their other needs. Families are often
forced to live on credit, in a precarious state, where any crisis will
result in an inability to pay the rent, and consequently may lead to
eviction.
A. The Aggregate Housing Ratio
The growth of homelessness can be viewed as an aggregate rather
than an individual problem." Of the 5.4 million renters who paid
more than 60% of their income on rent, 95% of them had annual
incomes under $15,000.1 Since there are more people below the
poverty line than there are affordable low-income housing units, it is
inevitable that some people will be left without an affordable place to
live.101 Low income renters have great difficulty obtaining housing
which qualify as affordable low-income housing under HUD's
definition,"°t and spend much higher percentages of their income on
housing costs.
Federal and state funding has been rapidly diminishing. This has
caused an increase in competition for very limited resources. In 1983,
the gap between poor households and the number of housing units
affordable to them was 14 million units."03 In 1985, 11.6 million
low-income renter households were competing for 4.7 million low-rent
units. Thus, there were two and one-half times as many poor
households as there were affordable housing units."° In 1991, two-
fifths of the twenty-six states that appropriated funds for affordable
housing cut their programs."~ Since there is a lack of affordable
housing, those who cannot locate housing or double-up with friends
and family are left homeless."6
99. See McChesney, supra note 63, at 309.
100. See CUSHING DOLBEARE, LOW INCOME HOUSING NEEDS 2 (1987), cited in
Bennett, supra note 66. at n.60.
101. See McChesney, supra note 63, at 309.
102. See discussion, supra part II.
103. See McChesney, supra note 63, at 309-310.
104. See id. at 310.
105. See Moore, supra note 57, at 9.
106. See McChesney. supra note 63. at 310.
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1. Some of the Ways People Become Homeless
People become homeless in a variety of ways. It is useful to
examine some of them in order to assess whether the loss of homes
can be prevented. If the incidence can be prevented and will save
money, misery, and societal harm, precautionary devices should be
instituted. Present policy should be put to a cost-benefit test to
determine whether it should remain in effect. Even if precautionary
devices cost money, if it can be demonstrated that they cost less than
the alternative of not instituting them, even those who are fiscally and
politically conservative might agree to such measures.
a. Loss of Employment
One cause of homelessness is the loss of employment. When an
individual loses his or her job, and unemployment benefits expire,
finances become precarious, and funds deplete rapidly. Once all funds
have been drained, the individual will be unable to meet rent
obligations, usually leading to an eviction for nonpayment of rent.
Sometimes people in this situation can double-up with relatives for a
period of time, but often will become homeless if they remain out of
work.' 7
b. Family Breaks Up
Another cause of homelessness is the breakup of a relationship,
especially when the breakup is due to domestic violence. In such
situations, women often leave their partners and their housing rather
suddenly. When battered women's shelters are full, and there are no
friends or family willing to provide housing, the streets or homeless
shelters are the only recourse. Regardless of the level of skills, a
single parent without child care cannot go to work. Although she can
apply for AFDC while living in a shelter, high rents and move-in costs
associated with new housing units are prohibitive."°
107. See generally id.
108. See id. at 311.
129
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c. Failure of Public Assistance Benefits to Keep Up
With Rising Rental Costs
Unlike those who lose a job or leave a relationship, many AFDC
recipients lose their housing because their benefit levels fail to keep up
with the rising cost of rent."° AFDC parents often find themselves,
after the rent payment is made, with less and less money for other
expenses, such as light, heat and telephone. When an emergency
arises, money must be diverted from the rent to cover it. In a
situation as precarious as this, attempts to make back rent payments
are futile, and eviction is the ultimate result."' When AFDC
recipients lose their apartments, they often lose their benefits as well
due to the lack of an address."' Once homeless, it becomes
extremely difficult to acquire enough funds to move into another
apartment,1 I in particular because of prohibitive start-up costs.
All of these avenues leading to homelessness share some
commonalities. They demonstrate that becoming homeless is a process
rather than based upon a single event.13  For individuals in any of
these situations, homelessness is the result of a series of events
occurring over a period of time. Most of these individuals are not
employed, and all are impoverished. Additionally, many of these
people, once displaced from their housing, have to contend with "the
reality of the low-income housing ratio." 1
4
109. Rent also increased at a faster rate than inflation. See Jencks, supra note 62.
at 82.
110. See McChesney, supra note 63. at 311.
111. See discussion supra part I.C.1.
112. See McChesney, supra note 63, at 311.
113. See id. There are cases where a single event does cause homelessness. If a fire
destroys a home, for example, the inhabitants of that home would become homeless.
114. See id. The reality is that there is not enough low-cost housing. There are
many more people in need of low-income housing than there are low-income housing units
available. Since many people can not afford the rental prices for market-rate housing, or, if
they can afford the rent, are unable to pay the move-in costs associated with a new apartment
(several months rent paid up-front), they either stay with relatives or friends, or become
homeless. Id.
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2. Policy Implications of the Aggregate Housing Ratio
The aggregate housing ratio provides evidence that homelessness
is not caused by individual characteristics; rather, it is attributable to
a lack of affordable housing." 5 Since the aggregate housing ratio
describes a scenario in which there will always be households without
homes, it is inevitable that people will be homeless unless change is
instituted. One conclusion which can be drawn from the aggregate
housing ratio is that a highly effective method of dealing with
homelessness is to reduce the number of poor people competing for
affordable housing." 6 This can be accomplished by reducing the
number of people who are poor, through the creation of more jobs
which pay decent wages, thereby decreasing the number of poor
people in this counting. Increasing public assistance benefits would
also provide people with more funds to contribute towards housing
costs.
Homelessness can also be combatted by increasing the number of
low-income housing units.117 This can be achieved in a number of
ways. The government can build more low-income housing (i.e.,
housing projects). Alternatively, the government can allocate funds
for the poor to cover their rent in market rate units. Additionally, the
government can provide incentives to developers and landlords to
allocate a number of new units to the poor at a reduced rent.
Rehabilitating vacant housing units would also add more units to the
existing stock.
One policy implication of the aggregate housing ratio is the illogic
of opening emergency shelters to house temporarily dispossessed
people."' It is illogical because homelessness is an expensive
situation and is not a temporary condition. There are different issues
for different groups of homeless people. For example, homeless
mentally ill people may have more difficulty remaining housed than
others. While shelters may be humanitarian for providing short-term
115. See id. at 312.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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relief to people on the streets,1 t9 they do not change the fact that
there are too few affordable units and too many people in need of low-
cost housing.
Another policy implication is that transitional housing programs
will not have much impact on the number of homeless.""
Transitional housing programs which teach "living skills," e.g.,
budgeting, shopping, and home management, are designed to aid those
with "individual defects." These programs are founded on the theory
that homelessness is caused by personal defects which can be
overcome with education. Advocates of this approach believe that
after learning these "living skills," the homeless will be more
successful in their next housing unit. The housing ratio, however,
challenges the logic of this approach because it indizates that
homelessness is not due to poor "living skills." Homelessness is a
result of a lack of affordable housing units. Unless there are a
sufficient number of affordable housing units for everyone who
qualifies for low-cost housing, even the best skills cannot rectify
homelessness.
Other transitional housing programs house people until they are
able to find permanent housing. 21 They are designed to bridge the
gap between the streets and a permanent apartment. However, under
the housing ratio, this type of transitional housing is also illogical
because there is a shortage of affordable permanent housing. If those
in transitional housing obtain permanent housing, it is likely they are
replacing other poor people who have become homeless. 2
Certainly they are displacing another poor household who would
otherwise occupy the unit" given that there are a greater number
of poor families than affordable units. Transitional housing serves to
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. These programs commonly last from three to eighteen months.
122. Of course, it is possible that in some instances, the family who lived there before
has moved to a market-rate rental or a different size unit due to changes in family
composition. However, the aggregate housing ratio statistics on the poor and the recipients
of public assistance indicate that this is the exception rather than the rule. See generally
McChesney, supra note 63, at 312; see also Bennett, supra note 66.
123. See McChesney, supra note 63, at 312.
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provide more low-income housing; however, it does so only on a
temporary basis with different families rotating through the units., 4
These policy implications do not necessarily mean emergency
shelters and transitional housing programs should be eliminated. It
does mean that this type of housing does not change the aggregate
housing ratio.1" A lack of affordable housing, and consequentially
homelessness, will co-exist with these programs until more affordable
housing is made available. Communities that spend a considerable
amount of money on these types of programs should not assume they
have addressed the homeless problem as best they can."' Only by
building more affordable housing will the homeless problem be
diminished.
1I1. THE INTERSECTION OF WELFARE, HOUSING
AND HOMELESSNESS
There is no doubt that the much-diminished value
of AFDC payments has contributed directly to the
appearance and rise of female-headed households
among the homeless population. Female-headed
households dependent on AFDC would find it
difficult or impossible to cover their housing and
other expenses on payment levels that are clearly
lower than the rents typically charged for small
apartments. AFDC-dependent mothers live
exceedingly close to financial disaster; any
unanticipated expense could create a crisis.
Given the current purchasing power of the
average AFDC payment, it is no wonder that
many young-female headed households often
124. Id. at 313.
125. Id.
126. For example, between 1980-1987, New York City pumped large sums of money
into shelters and transitional housing, but the numbers of homeless families kept growing.
By 1987, the city was spending $305 million per year to shelter 28.000 people per night. Had
this money been directed into building more affordable housing, the problem vould have been
moderated. Ultimately. the city opted to put the same amount of money into building
permanent affordable housing. Id.
133
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become literally homeless. Indeed, the
Massachusetts courts have recently compared the
average AFDC payment with the average rents in
Boston and concluded that the payment level must
be contributing directly to the rise of
homelessness. 127
At the intersection of welfare, housing, and homelessness lies
confused government policy. This policy (or lack thereof) fails to
address adequately the lack of affordable housing and the paucity of
welfare benefits (except to cut them further). Those who advocate this
policy believe that the answer to the problems of the homeless lies in
welfare hotels, gymnasium floors, and various other "temporary
shelters."
Temporary shelters cost substantially more than rents at the low
end of the housing market. 2 In 1987, New York City spent an
average of $1,612 per month per family to house families in hotel
rooms which did not contain cooking facilities,2 9 but did contain
lead-based paint.130 This money, or a fraction of it, could have been
used to assist families in paying back rent in order to avoid evictions.
Likewise the money could have been applied to the creation and
preservation of affordable housing, or been used to create incentives
for owners to rent to low-income tenants by providing tax b; eaks, one
time grants, and other incentives. It was not. And for the most part,
it is still going only to temporary emergency shelters.
While the government may profess to be saving the taxpayer
money by cutting the budget of the housing agency, the taxpayer may
be spending the same, or more money in other areas. When the
federal government cuts housing subsidies, and more people lose their
127. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 42. The court ruled that in order for a family to
avoid homelessness and live a minimally decent existence, AFDC payment levels would have
to be doubled. Id. at 74, n.5.
128. Id. at 16.
129. Rooms cost as much as $1800 per month. Id. at 16; See also McChesney,
supra note 63, at 313.
130. See Sara Rimer, Despite Pledge, Homeless Still in Hotel, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 11.
1989, at A29.
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homes, costs to cities and states rise. In addition to the costs to feed,
shelter, and rehouse the homeless, many other expenses are incurred
at the local level by these "money-saving" budget cuts. Additional
police, medical, and jail costs, and losses incurred by businesses are
the results of increased homelessness in a discrete area."'
A. Welfare Policy as De Facto Housing Policy
HUD's budget was drastically cut in the 1980s, leading to a
departmental policy of slashing programs, cutting grants, and refusing
to assist more people. The number of homeless grew and the welfare
department incurred many of the costs saved by the housing
department. The welfare department pays for welfare hotels, and as
the number of homeless grows, the bill for emergency shelters also
increases. If sufficient affordable housing were available, there would
not be a need for welfare hotels.
Federal welfare policy was transformed into housing policy
because the government failed to detect and respond to the structural
deficiencies in the housing market, and instead viewed homelessness
as a short-term crisis.1 32  Funding for welfare hotels comes from
AFDC and Emergency Assistance to Families with Children
(EANFC), 33 both under the auspices of the Department of Health
and Human Services, rather than from federal housing agencies like
HUD."3  These emergency shelters are called "welfare hotels"
because they house welfare recipients, albeit on a "temporary"
basis, 35 and are funded by the welfare department instead of the
housing department.
The primary reason the welfare department entered into the
housing business was because homelessness was seen as a temporary
aberration, not as a structural deficiency in the housing market.176
131. Coates, supra note 34. at 256.
132. See Bennett. supra note 66. at 29-30.
133. Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 670 (1988).
134. See Bennett. supra note 66, at 30.
135. The "temporariness" sometimes stretches for years. See McChesney, supra note
63. at 313.
136. See id.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 1996
HYBRID
As a result, public policy sought to cure this "temporary" problem
with emergency grants. A more productive use of the money would
be to build permanent housing or increase the income available to the
poor, thereby allowing them to afford their own housing.' 37 The
welfare department should not be in the business of constructing
housing for the poor. Building housing is within the province of the
housing department. Whether the money is spent by the housing
department on housing construction or by the welfare department on
temporary shelters, it is still being spent. Pointing to savings in one
area may provide a smoke screen for spending in another. It may be
politically wise to take credit for budget reductions, but that does not
necessarily translate into savings for the taxpayers.
Thirty states have adopted a "special needs" program, partially
funded by the federal government, which compensates for the
inadequacy and inflexibility of AFDC. The program provides cash to
AFDC recipients when a "special need" arises. It is designe-d to meet
unique circumstances on a case-by-case basis.138 In a few states
special needs funds are used to pay the shelter costs of welfare
hotels, t39 although most states do not pay for welfare hotels with this
funding.
More than half of the thirty state welfare agencies made use of a
cooperative program, the Emergency Assistance (EA) program,14
to help families meet emergency needs in 1988.41 Som of these
states used EA funds to address the housing needs of welfare
recipients. Similar to the special needs allowances, some states use
the EA funds to cover the costs of welfare hotels, while others use the
resources to prevent evictions, or to help families retain their
residences.142 While using special needs allowances and EA funds
137. See Bennett, supra note 66, at 30. If the welfare department does not fund
shelters and transitional housing, families that lose their housing will be left with no
alternatives to the street.
138. See Wolf, supra note 17, at 273; Bennett, supra note 66, at 39.
139. See Wolf, supra note 17, at 273.
140. Authorized under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601
(1988).
141. EA is funded partly by the federal government and partly by the state
governments.
142. See Wolf, supra note 17, at 273.
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to pay for emergency shelters prevent families from living on the
streets, the program funds were originally earmarked for "special" and
"emergency" conditions. 43 Homelessness is not an "emergency"
unless an emergency is a "potentially infinitely recurring
condition."'" Furthermore, unless significantly less money is spent
to provide shelter under the auspices of these programs than is saved
by eliminating funding for procuring low-cost housing, the federal
government is failing to achieve its goal.
Welfare hotels are "another result of inadequate benefits,
inadequate housing stock, and a system forced to respond to a crisis
beyond its capacity." 45  These "temporary shelters," which
sometimes house families for as long as three years,"4 are often sub-
standard and have innumerable code violations. Rats, lead-based
paint, inadequate heat and ventilation, infestations of vermin, and
locations within high crime and drug neighborhoods are
commonplace.' 47 Temporary shelters also cost significantly more
than an apartment. 41 These "high-rent, low-service warehouses for
society's castoffs11 49 are funded by the federal government, while a
sufficient number of affordable apartments are not. The payment
authorized under AFDC may be increased by 500% to house a family
in a hotel,' but there is generally no counterpart permitting a
family rental assistance to remain in their home, or move-in costs for
a new apartment.' 5'
143. Id.: Bennett, supra note 66, at 39.
144. See Bennett, supra note 66, at 48.
145. See Wolf, supra note 17. at 276-77.
146. Id. at 277.
147. See generally JONATHAN KOZOL, RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN (1988).
148. See Bennett, supra note 66, at 35. When rental rates are negotiated fairly,
transitional housing does, at times, cost more than a temporary shelter. See Wolf. supra note
17, at 277.
149. See Wolf. supra note 17, at 277.
150. Id.
151. However, in limited instances, some states have used EA and special needs
allowances to cover these costs.
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B. Litigation at the Intersection
Some state laws and constitutions impose obligations upon states
to provide minimum levels of subsistence. 152 Advocates use these
laws and constitutions in state courts to expand the supply of shelters
for the homeless. Unfortunately, these methods are only successful in
obtaining shelter, and not permanent housing.
The strategy of looking to welfare law as a basis for obtaining
shelter is deficient because it guarantees only survival. Survival is
achieved through temporary shelters, and therefore it is inappropriate
for a court to order that affordable permanent housing 1x: provided
when the source of law is welfare law. Another problem associated
with the litigation in this area is that most of the success achieved in
court is contained in consent decrees. These decrees do not provide
precedent which can be applied to future cases.153 Thus, each time
an attorney challenges homelessness utilizing welfare law, she
reinvents the wheel.
Although the past strategy has been unsatisfactory, it is difficult
to locate a better source of law which will yield success in obtaining
permanent housing for the homeless. If litigators wish to avoid using
welfare law as a basis for housing claims, it is unclear what other
avenue will provide constitutional or statutory authority to stake a
cognizable claim. The federal constitution is inadequate in the area of
housing law. It does not contain any provision requiring the
government to provide economic security, shelter, or hous:ing.
One source of welfare law used to advance claims for temporary
housing is Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, as previously
discussed.154 Title IV-A provides the basis to claim a statutory right
to shelter. As a result, welfare hotel funding has been derived from
this statute. Since Title IV-A is an entitlement, there is no monetary
cut-off, and everyone in need should be entitled to shelter. The
strategy of asserting a right to shelter under the AFDC and EANFC
programs of the Social Security Act has had mixed results. The
152. For example, the New York State Constitution so provides.
153. See Bennett, supra note 66, at 31.
154. See supra part M.A.; Bennett, supra note 66, at 32.
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reason the results have not been consistent is because the Supreme
Court has sent mixed messages about the validity of such claims, 155
and because litigating for permanent housing solutions under a
temporary benefits program is inclined to have limited success at
best."'56 Litigators must continue to search for better sources of law
in which to ground litigation to obtain affordable housing for the poor.
As new statutes and regulations are enacted, perhaps a source will
arise. However, at present, litigation will likely continue to be
brought under welfare law.
C. Cooperation Between Housing and Welfare Administrators
The most common problem seen among low-income renters is that
too much of their income is spent on housing.' 7  No major
legislation has been introduced to rectify this problem despite the fact
that inability to pay rent is a leading cause of homelessness. -'3
Rather than provide rental assistance increases to the poor, cuts in
housing assistance and legislation designed to "end welfare as we
know it" pervade the present political agenda of many politicians.
Serious consideration is not given to changing the welfare system to
make it more responsive to the needs of the recipients. Suggestions
that benefits to single-parent families and others be increased until they
are large enough to cover the cost of shelter59 are absent from the
debate at the federal level, and would be unlikely to succeed in the
present political climate.
In 1988, the administrators of the welfare system at the state and
local levels sought to transform the welfare system. When they spoke
of welfare reform, they were not using the phrase as a euphemism for
budget slashing. They proposed sweeping changes to the philosophy,
organization, delivery system and benefit levels of the welfare system.
155. Id. at 33.
156. Id.
157. Michael A. Stegman, Remedies for the Homelessness: An Analysis cfPotential
Housing Policy Programs and Responses, in HOMELESS CHILDREN AND YoUm 225, 251
(Julee H. Kryder-Coe et al. eds., 1991).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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These changes became the touchstone for federal reform legislation
contained in the Family Support Act of 1988.160 The administrators
sought to replace welfare dependency with self-sufficiency, and delved
into housing policy and economic entitlement. They found that a
prerequisite for strong, self-sufficient families is
the ability to live in safe, decent, affordable
housing. Today steadily rising housing costs and
steadily diminishing resources - both wages and
the value of cash assistance - force many
American families into housing that is neither
safe nor decent. Where safe, decent housing is
available it is often not affordable. Federal
housing assistance for low-income families has
dropped precipitously while the number of
homeless individuals and families has grown, a
circumstance that marks the urgent need for new
policies to address the housing needs of poor
Americans.
161
The administrators laid out a number of recommendations to
reduce family poverty. In formulating these recommendations, they
stepped beyond their usual roles to touch upon housing policies and
programs, 62 in response to the homelessness problem.
The National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials
(NAHRO) and the American Public Welfare Association (APWA)
united in an endeavor to bridge the gap between the two systems. A
joint report was released containing a number of recommendations to
change the response of the welfare system to housing and
homelessness issues. Additionally, the Council of State Community
Affairs Agencies (COSCAA) joined forces with NAHRO 1:o address
welfare-housing linkages at the state level. These acknowledgements
160. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988) (codified In various ,ections of 42
U.S.C.); see Wolf, supra note 17, at 278.
161. See Wolf, supra note 17, at 279 (quoting American Public Welfare Association
1989, at 6).
162. Id.
140 [Vol. 3:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol3/iss1/7
1996] WELFARE, HOUSING AND HOMELESSNESS
that neither the housing nor welfare systems can effectively address the
issues without the other is encouraging because it is the only way self-
sufficiency and equitable housing for the poor can be achieved. 63
Unfortunately, however, current welfare reform discussions fail
to recognize the links between housing and welfare. They focus
primarily on cutting grant levels, increasing eligibility requirements,
and capping the amount of time a recipient is eligible to receive
benefits. The result of the present policy, combined with the current
political climate, is that families currently residing in emergency
shelters and transitional housing are unable to improve their living
arrangements because welfare benefits are too small to cover the cost
of rent, 64 and there is a paucity of new affordable housing on the
market. On average, neither AFDC, SSI nor GA provide shelter
payments that equal the cost of standard quality housing as measured
by HUD's Fair Market Rents: AFDC shelter payments represent only
49% of the applicable FMR, while SSI and GA allowances hover
around 66% of FMR.
When a homeless family enters the shelter system, the probability
that they will obtain affordable housing is actually enhanced because
they are advanced to the top of the waiting list for housing assistance
and are categorized as first priority. If, however, they stay with
friends or family or spend 80% of their income on rent, they do not
receive a higher priority for housing assistance.
D. The Expenses Involved in Providing Emergency Housing
There has been little discussion among federal legislators
concerning the prevention or elimination of homelessness. Providing
rental assistance to the poor, or providing assistance in rehousing the
homeless is not politically savvy because it would cost $10 billion a
year to raise welfare allowances to meet Fair Market Rent
163. Id. at 282.
164. See Stegman, supra note 157, at 251.
165. 'Id. Many states pay a flat AFDC grant regardless of shelter costs. This author
describes the converse - grants tied to shelter costs. SSI benefits are more generous than
AFDC and GA.
141
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 1996
[Vol. 3:1
standards."6 Major welfare programs would have to railse shelter
allowances by 50% to 100% to meet these standards. 67 These costs
are not as extreme as they appear on their face because the expense of
"emergency housing" would disappear if the standards were met.
In 1987, New York City spent an average of $125.86 per day, on
the average, to house a family of four in a barracks-style shelter, and
an average of $91.95 per day to house a family in a hotel room.168
A single room in a hotel in Westchester County, New York for a
family came to $3,750 per month.1 69 The District of Columbia paid
$10 million to one hotel over the course of seven years for temporary
shelter for the homeless.
170
1. Where Does the Money Come From?
Emergency housing is paid for in a variety of ways. Some states
cover the cost of emergency hotel placements by making use of the
extraordinary outlay provision in AFDC for "special needs," and states
which participate in EANFC fund hotel bills through this
program. 171 Some local social service agencies fund temporary
shelters through other federal funding sources authorized under the
Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Amendments Act of
1988.172 These sources include money allocated to local boards
through the Emergency Food and Shelter Grant Program under the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Emergency
166. Id. at 252.
167. Id.
168. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE HOTELS: USES COSTS
AND ALTERNATIVES, at 32 (citing New York City Mayor's Advisory Task Force on the
Homeless); Bennett, supra note 66, at 48.
169. See Henry, Homeless Families in "Welfare Motels" Want Them Closed, 10
YOUTH L. NEws 12 (July-Aug. 1989), cited in Bennett, supra note 66, at 48-9.
170. See Requiem for a Hellhole, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1989, at A18, cited in
Bennett, supra note 66, at 48.
171. See discussion, supra part III.A.
172. Pub. L. No. 100-628, 102 Stat. 3259 (1988). The amendment re-authorized
finding created in the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of 1987. Pub. L. No.
100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (1987).
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Shelter Grants Program.71 Additional local agency funding is
obtained through the Community Services Block Grant Program- 4
Since funding for emergency housing is derived from so many
different sources, the total expenditures are often camouflaged. It
makes good political sense to spread these costs, making them less
noticeable, than it is to pump billions of dollars into housing
construction. Yet it might well be cheaper to construct new housing.
Furthermore, construction would provide jobs, and possibly benefit the
economy.
E. Rising Rent, Rising Inflation, Static AFDC
No Predictability for AFDC Recipients
as Housing Costs Rise
The elimination of federal housing subsidies not only results in
rents that are unaffordable, but also undermines the predictability of
rent."7  For families on fixed incomes, this is extremely crucial
because when market forces drive rents up by 300%,176 they are
unable to make their rent payments. AFDC does not provide cost of
living adjustments. "Accompanying this rapid increase in rents is a
significant decrease in the ability of welfare-dependent families to pay
for them,"'" because benefits fail to increase along with
inflation. 7 For AFDC families, rent-subsidized housing is the only
173. Administered by HUD.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1397 et seq. (1991).
175. Bennett. supra note 66, at 46.
176. During this time period from 1970 to 1983. the national median rent rose by
over $200, (it went from $108 to $315). while the number of units renting for below $80 fell
from 5.5 million to 650,000. Wright & Lam. Homelessness and the Low Income Housing
Supply, 17 Soc. POL. 48. 49 (1987); Bennett, supra note 66. at n.72.
177. Bennett, supra note 66, at 46.
178. Between 1970 and 1989. only two AFDC jurisdictions had increases in payment
levels in adjusted dollars. In contract to these two atypical states, the median state decreased
its AFDC payments between 1980 and 1989 by 37%. STAFF OF HOUSE CoMMIrrrE ON
WAYS AND MEANS, BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATE ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS. 101ST CONG. IST SEss. 546-47
(1989). cited in Bennett. supra note 66. at 46.
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solution for obtaining stable and affordable housing. 179
1. AFDC and FMR
Fair Market Rents, or FMRs, are used by HUD to gauge housing
costs. They are set up at the 45th percentile of market rents.t'° In
several states, AFDC grants are far below the FMRs. When an
AFDC family does not receive a housing subsidy, and lives in a city
where the FMR is higher than their AFDC grant, locating affordable
housing is a very daunting task. Only the worst apartments in the
worst neighborhoods are attainable. A comparison of 1987 AFDC
grants to FMRs for a few cities illustrates the extent of the problem:
in Massachusetts the maximum AFDC grant for a family of three was
$539, while the FMR for a two-bedroom apartment ranged from $488
to $810 depending on its location; in Washington, D.C. the AFDC
grant was $393, and the FMR $695; in Alabama the AFDC grant was
$118, the FMR ranged from $237 to $410.181
F. Housing for the Poor in the Future
1. Conversion of Units to Market Rate Rental Units
Predictions for the future are bleak. It is projected that the
number of low income households will continue to grow,1  while
the number of affordable housing units will continue to decline.
183
Many low income housing commitments"s are due to expire in the
near future.-'5 The owners are thereafter uninhibited from raising
rents to market rates. Many private owners who entered into contracts
179. See Bennett, supra note 66, at 46.
180. 54 Fed. Reg. 39866 (1989).
181. Figures cited in Bennett, supra note 66, at 47.
182. See Leonard et al., supra note 56, at xvii.
183. See id.
184. I refer here to commitments made by borrowers of govermnnt money at
subsidized rates who agreed in return to house low income tenants for a fixed number of
years.
185. See id. at xviii; see Bennett, supra note 66, at 45.
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with the government under Section 8 certificate and vouchers
programs committed themselves to housing the poor for periods
typically ranging from 5 to 15 years. By 1997, 25% of these
federally-assisted rental units commitments will expire." Upon
expiration, the owners of these properties will be able to raise rents,
offer the units as condominiums, or convert the units for non-housing
uses. 187
Public housing, the housing of last resort, is not likely to provide
any additional relief in the future. Appropriations for new public
housing were eliminated under President Reagan, 188 and have not
been restored. Waiting lists for public housing and for units provided
under Section 8 are decades long. As of 1990, the New York City
Housing Authority had a waiting list of 200,000 households for
190,000 units, all of which were occupied.' The average length
of time a non-priority household would have to wait to obtain housing
was more than 35 years."g Across the river in Jersey City, New
Jersey the situation was bleak as well. The wait was over 10 years
and there was an occupancy rate of 115%.1 These types of waits
are commonplace.192 Turnover rates average 1% per year, and the
number of units is decreasing as units are demolished, closed, and
rendered unusable.93 Unless a family is homeless, the likelihood of
gaining entry into public housing is virtually non-existent. Many
housing authorities are no longer accepting applications, and all
housing authorities operate on a priority system whereby homeless
families move to the top of the list and thus, other families are unable
186. See Leonard et al., supra note 56, at xviii: Bennett, supra note 66. at 45.
187. See Leonard et al., supra note 56, at xviii. Non-housing uses might include
storage or other commercial uses.
188. See Peter Marcuse, Homelessness and Housing Policy. in HOMELESS IN
AMERICA 138. 148 (Carol L.M. Caton ed., 1990).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 158, n.26.
192. In Baltimore, 13,000 persons are waiting for 17,000 units and in Chicago, there
are 44,000 waiting for 49,000 units. See id.
193. See id.
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to obtain housing units. 194
Under § 221(d)(3) of the Housing Act of 1961195 and § 236 of
the Fair Housing Act of 1968,1% both federal housing programs, the
federal government gave mortgages to private developers who agreed
to lease units to low and moderate income tenants for 40 years. Both
programs provided the developers with the option to pre-pay the
mortgage and discharge themselves of their obligation to the
government after 20 years. The twenty-year restriction will soon
expire for a number of these units."9 There is a strong possibility
many of them will be converted to housing for higher income tenants.
In the immediate future, 243,000 units of low-income housing are
likely to be removed from the subsidized housing stock. 198
2. Loss of Units Due to Disrepair
Lack of maintenance is another serious threat to the existing
affordable housing stock. Public and privately owned affordable units
which are not subsidized will be lost in the future because they are not
being adequately maintained. Unless the units are rehabilitated and
provided with the necessary maintenance, 199 they will become
uninhabitable. A study conducted for HUD discovered that "more
than half of the public housing households now live in projects needing
moderate to substantial rehabilitation just to meet HUD's mandatory
quality standards. "2  The study found that it would take more than
$20 billion to complete the backlog of major capital repailrs needed.
Federal funding allocated for these repairs in 1989 was $1.6 billion,
and the Bush Administration had proposed reducing funding in 1990
194. Interviews with Peter Schneider and Mike Donahue, Attorneys 2t Community
Legal Services, Public Housing Unit, in Philadelphia, PA (Jan. 1994 - Jan. 1595).
195. Pub. L. No. 87-70 § 101(a), 75 Stat. 149 (1961) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1715 (1988)).
196. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
3601-31 (1986)).
197. In 1995, 331,705 of the units are subject to expire, and an addit onal 727,878
are due to expire in 2025. See Bennett, supra note 66, at 45.
198. See id. at 45; see Leonard et al., supra note 56, at xviii.
199. See Leonard et al., supra note 55, at xviii.
200. See id.
146 [Vol. 3:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol3/iss1/7
1996] WELFARE, HOUSING AND HOMELESSNESS 147
to $1 billion, a decrease of more than one-third.""
G. Homelessness Costs More than Affordable Housing
The economic impact of homelessness on a community is
extremely high. There are many hidden costs associated with
homelessness. In addition to shelter expenses and costs associated
with soup kitchens, there are a number of other costs related to the
presence of a homeless population in a city.2" Some of these
"hidden costs" include: police, eviction of the homeless from parks
and streets; remodeling, re-tooling, iron-plating in parks; ambulance
services; costs associated with the criminal justice system including
jail, court costs, public defenders and prosecutors; burial costs; mental
health services; medical costs; social work; legal aid; costs to school
districts; costs to local businesses including guards, lighting, thefts,
cleaning and painting, lost business, increased insurance, and arson;
tax losses including sales, property, and hotellmotel occupancy taxes;
risk of epidemics; risk of major fires; and loss of labor and
capital.0 3 The deepest impacts cannot be quantified - the moral and
societal damage visited upon the homeless. People usually take notice
when "their pocketbooks are threatened." This observation may be
useful in selling low cost housing programs and increases in public
assistance to the American public. 4
By examining the costs of jailing homeless people, an illustration
of indirect costs spent on the homeless can be ascertained.
201. See i. at xix.
202. See Coates, supra note 34, at 254.
203. Id. at 254-255.
204. Homelessness as an economic problem is costing our communities millions of
dollars in added police, jail and court costs, lost tax revenues from properties devalued by the
presence of the homeless, rising insurance costs because the presence of the homeless poses
an increased threat of arson, petty burglaries, accidental fires, and vandalism. In addition,
there are increased maintenance costs for areas in which the homeless congregate, the frequent
loss to the general public of the use of swaths of public parks and recreational areas because
the homeless have "taken over," and lost sales and tourist-oriented revenues suffered by
businesses in areas frequented by the homeless. The citizens who are the most difficult to
motivate to join the fight against homelessness for moral reasons may be the easiest to
motivate for economic reasons. Id. at 256.
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Furthermore, jailing the homeless provides a striking example of how
the homeless are perceived and treated in our society.205 Jails cost
significantly more than apartment rents, yet many homeless individuals
can often be found in jail. In some cases the police jail the. homeless
to appease area residents, businesses in particular, who do not want
the homeless in their neighborhoods.2" In other cases, homeless
people seek out jails as a more favorable alternative to life on the
streets. 2' Individuals who are homeless are less likely to be
released on their own recognizance because they have "insufficient
community ties" to ensure their return to court.20 8 The jail related
costs to the government would suggest that finding affordable housing
is a preferable solution for everyone.
In New York, it costs taxpayers $162 a day to incarcerate an
individual at Rikers Island." The cost for a 90 day sentence is
$14,580.210 This same amount of money would cover the annual
rent on a low cost apartment in New York City.211 In 1984-85, 10-
15% of all the inmates incarcerated in the San Diego County jail
system were homeless. They had been incarcerated for "crimes" such
as sleeping in a restricted area, and public drunkennes:s. These
individuals would not have been in jail if they had a home since it is
205. Most scholars who study the homeless fail to take account of tho:;e who are in
jail because they are part of the "invisible homeless."
206. Redburn, supra note 32, at 36-37, 50-51. Homeless people are arrested for
"crimes" such as loitering, vagrancy, public drunkenness, and disorderly conduct. Id.
Loitering and vagrancy are no longer considered crimes, but police still arrest people for these
behaviors and then charge the homeless with other charges, such as simple assault for refusing
to move along when ordered to do so by the police. Id. at 54, n.5.
207. Id. at 50-51; Rich Bragg, A Thief Dines Out, Hoping Later to Eat In, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 1994, at Al. "A survey conducted in New York City during the early
1980's found that those who had spent time in both shelters and jails rated die jails superior
to the shelters on cleanliness, safety, privacy, and food quality. Shelters ranked ahead of jails
only on personal freedom." Id. Furthermore, shelters are more dangerous today than they
were in the 1980's. See Jencks, supra note 62, at 45, citing Rossi. DOWN AND OUT IN
AMERICA.
208. Based upon my experience representing people arrested in Brooklyn, N.Y.
209. See Bragg, supra note 207, at B4.
210. See id.
211. See generally Real Estate Section, N.Y. TIMES and Apartment Lisl:ings Section,
THE VILLAGE VOICE (Oct. 1995 - Apr. 1996).
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not illegal to sleep or become inebriated in one's home. 2 '
Jailing the homeless is also costly because of medical, dental, and
psychiatric costs associated with incarceration.1 3 Jails are legally
bound to provide these services to inmates, whereas many homeless
people are not entitled to such services from social service agencies.
The homeless, in many cases, must wait until they are incarcerated
before they gain access to these services. As a result, their health
conditions become more complicated and more expensive to treat than
would have been at the onset of their illnesses.214
IV. CONCLUSION
When an examination of current welfare and housing policies is
conducted, it is apparent that the number of homeless will continue to
grow. The trend in welfare policy is to cut benefit levels and make
eligibility standards more stringent. The trend in housing policy is to
decrease funding and allow the number of affordable housing units to
diminish. Each of these policies would by itself cause an increase in
homelessness. The combined effect of the two policies operating
simultaneously is evident to anyone who visits a large city in the
United States. The number of people forced out of their homes and
into the streets has been growing through the 1980's and 1990's.
Rhetoric about welfare reform pervades the media. Discussions
focus on cutting public assistance and "ending welfare as we know it."
Cuts in public assistance leave the poor with fewer resources to
purchase indispensable commodities. One of the most costly of these
commodities, housing, will be pushed further out of reach if benefits
continue to decline. Families presently spending 80% of their cash
grants on housing will not be able to pay their rent if their benefits are
further decreased.
Housing policy is seriously misguided. The federal government
has substantially cut funding for affordable housing. There is little
construction of new housing units, and existing affordable units are
212. See Coates, supra note 34, at 258.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 259.
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rapidly disappearing from the low-income market. As a re:ult, there
are fewer units available but increasingly greater competition for these
units. Large numbers of people are being housed in expensive
"temporary" housing. Welfare hotels, transitional housing units, and
shelters are more costly in the long run than to increase the funds
allocated to generate additional affordable housing units.
Providing more funding for welfare and affordable housing is, in
the long run, economically more sensible and more humane for the
homeless, the low income individuals, and the public in general. No
one enjoys the task of explaining homelessness and poverty t:o a child,
and no one enjoys stepping past the homeless men and women sleeping
on the streets.
In order to convince the populace to support increased government
spending on housing and welfare, information on the hidden costs
must be disseminated. Taxpayers need to be informed that while their
federal taxes may be cut, the savings may well be counterbalanced by
increased state, city, and local taxes. Furthermore, voters should to
be apprised of the many unwritten policies associated with
homelessness which exist in their communities, such as incarceration
of the homeless at $30,000 a year per inmate. If the public becomes
aware of how expensive welfare reform and present housing policy
are, they may strongly advocate a policy reversal. Only then will the
trends toward greater funding cuts be reversed.
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